The 2014 This book, Churchill “The

The Making of a Grand Strategist
David Jablonski, Published by PICKLE PARTNER PUBLISHING, 2014

This book, Churchill “The Making of a Grand Strategist “by DAVID JABLONSKY is a great book, teach us how to be an expert decision maker. His leadership is unique than the other world leader ever born. His thoughts about leadership inspire all young leader, leaders are self-created is one of his lesson, he transcended numerous limitations from an unprepossessing physical endowment to a distracting speech impediment, transforming himself into heroic mold conjured in his romantic imagination. This process of self-creation never ended. He was continually evolving in significant ways, not held back by the needs for predictability and consistency that limit so many others.
DR. DAVID JABLONSKY is the Professor of National Security Affairs, Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College. A graduate of Dartmouth College, Kansas University and Boston University, Dr. Jablonski is the author of four books dealing with European history and international relations. He is a retired infantry colonel who has held the Elihu Root Chair of Strategy and the George C. Marshall Chair of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College.
The book begins with an explanation about Churchill background that he is the most bloodthirsty of amateur strategists that history has ever known,” Adolf Hitler stated in a 1941 speech. “He is as bad a politician as a soldier and as bad a soldier as a politician. That mastery did not occur overnight; nor was it the result of reading such great strategic thinker as SUN TZU or Clausewitz
It was, instead, the result of a long apprenticeship in military and public affairs.
Churchill adopted two goals: defeat the Germans and avoid unnecessary carnage. His grand strategy was to weaken Germany by attacking its more vulnerable periphery, opening up new fronts in distant theaters. His objective was to win peripheral victories, bringing new support for the British-French-Russian Triple Entente, while force Germany and the other Central Powers to rearrange their military and economic resources to the detriment of their western defenses.
Altering in the balance of forces in the west, Churchill believed, would allow a coordinated offensive that would overwhelm German defenses, break the stalemate of trench warfare, and ultimately, end the war. Attacking the Germans on multiple fronts would weaken their most decisive one.
Churchill’s strategy was unique not so much for its tactical and operational elements, but for recognizing the unity of politics, economics and war. As Churchill wrote, “The distinction between politics and strategy diminishes as the point of view is raised. At the summit true politics and strategy are one.
Churchill recognized the importance of lesser events to the fortunes of war. An action that brought a new ally to the cause, he thought, could be as important as an action that won a battle.
Churchill’s strategy was the nexus of the Western and Eastern schools which dominated Allied strategic thinking. Because it recognized the importance of the West, while acknowledging that affairs on the periphery could be equally crucial, the strategy appealed to the British War Cabinet. This is not to say that Churchill was the only man seeking an alternative solution; but his ideas were consistently the most nuanced and most far-reaching in their implications.
Strengths and benefits aside, Churchill’s grand strategy could only be validated by its success. Turkey, Churchill believed, was where the tenets of his strategy-flanking action, overwhelming force and surprise-could set in motion a chain of events that would end in Germany’s defeat. The gamble he took in early of 1915, attacking Turkey at the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, was all the more bitter for its abject failure. To understand his strategy and how it failed is to understand why World War I became the war that it did-and whether it could have been different.
he saw science and technology as a means to break the military deadlock, much as innovations ranging from the stirrup cavalry horse to the long bow and the Maxim gun had enabled armies to achieve surprise and win unexpected victories in the past
Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill is a character of a great leader certainly eighteenth century, nineteenth century in him is obvious, a large slice of the twentieth century and another layer have been the twenty-first century. Observations imply that Churchill’s leadership example is of limited value in our time.